QIANYAN
Previous Words
On the chessboard of the global semiconductor industry, the triple impact of supply disruptions, tariff barriers, and natural disasters is creating an unprecedented systemic crisis. This storm not only shakes the foundation of chip manufacturing, but also triggers a chain reaction in downstream fields such as consumer electronics, automotive manufacturing, and artificial intelligence, accelerating the reshaping of the global industrial competition pattern. Under the crisis, the strategic value of domestically produced semiconductor materials is unprecedentedly highlighted - their independent breakthrough is not only a sharp blade to break the technological monopoly of the United States and Japan, but also a key to breaking the bottleneck and mastering the discourse power of the industrial chain.
01
Import dependence: the Achilles heel of China's semiconductor industry
Semiconductor materials are the material cornerstone of chip manufacturing, and their supply chain stability directly affects industrial competitiveness. Despite the rapid development of China's semiconductor industry in recent years, it still heavily relies on imports in key material fields, and the pattern of American and Japanese companies dominating the high-end market has not yet been broken.
Data shows that among 22 key semiconductor materials, 15 varieties have a domestication rate of less than 20%. PSPI、 Core materials such as photoresist and 12 inch silicon wafers have become the hardest hit areas for bottlenecks; Only two materials have a localization rate of over 40%, but the high-end product market is still firmly controlled by American and Japanese companies. Specifically, as a key functional material for advanced semiconductor packaging, almost all high-end PSPI products in China rely on imports. HD Microsystems、 Companies such as Asahi Kasei, Sumitomo Electric, Toray, and Fujifilm have absolute advantages in polymer material synthesis processes and performance control, as well as customer resources, thanks to their profound technological accumulation.
As the core of photolithography technology, the quality of photoresist directly determines the precision of chip manufacturing. At present, the overall domestication rate of photoresist in China is less than 10%, and the domestication rate of high-end ArF photoresist is less than 1%. EUV photoresist has not yet achieved technological breakthroughs. Japanese companies such as Tokyo Applied Chemicals and Shinetsu Chemical have long held over 90% of the global high-end market share.
Other key materials such as 12 inch silicon wafers, masks, CMP polishing materials, etc. also exhibit an oligopoly monopoly pattern. The top six global companies hold over 90% of the market share for 12 inch silicon wafers, while domestic Chinese companies have a market share of less than 15%; In the high-end mask and polishing material market, American and Japanese companies together account for over 80% of the market share.
Note: The localization rate "X" is 0-20%; ! "is 25%~35%; √ "is between 45% and 60%
.jpg)
Source: Summary of Public Information, Materials Intelligence Research (PSR)
02
From technological monopoly to industrial strangulation: the "combination punch" of the US and Japan's supply cuts
In the global semiconductor industry map, the United States and Japan, relying on their technological and production capacity advantages, wield the baton of supply cuts and export controls, carefully weave a blockade network, and launch systematic suppression of China's semiconductor materials industry, attempting to achieve a "combination punch" from technological monopoly to industrial strangulation.
From 2019 to 2025, the semiconductor material supply restrictions led by the United States and Japan will be like a dense drumbeat. Japan's policies are frequent, with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry reviewing and controlling foreign exchange laws and regulations, and companies such as Tokyo Yinghua and Shinetsu Chemical actively cooperating; The United States has also issued new export control regulations to fuel the situation. From taking action against South Korea in 2019 to targeting China in the future, in terms of photoresist PSPI、 In the fields of electronic chemicals, third-generation semiconductors, and other materials, obstacles are constantly being set up, with time continuity and upgraded means.
As the leaders of this' strangulation war ', the United States and Japan have their own thoughts. Japan relies on its advantage in the materials industry and cooperates with the US strategy to consolidate its position; The United States is committed to maintaining technological hegemony. Leading companies in the United States and Japan, such as Shin Etsu Chemical, Asahi Kasei, and Dow Chemical, have adjusted their supply strategies driven by policies and other factors, using technology and market dominance to arbitrarily intervene in the global semiconductor material supply chain.
These restrictive measures, such as throwing giant stones into the semiconductor industry lake, have stirred up a thousand waves. On the production side, there is a shortage of raw materials, a drop in production capacity, and high costs for enterprises; The R&D path is hindered by advanced processes and setbacks in emerging fields; Safety concept, supply chain risks are fully displayed. But under pressure, there is also a driving force for change. Countries are increasingly emphasizing self-reliance and controllability, accelerating local research and development, cultivating suppliers, promoting the reconstruction of industrial supply chain ecology, and seeking new opportunities to break through crises.

03
Natural disasters add insult to injury: deadly risk of regional concentration in supply chains
During the period of 2019-2024, frequent natural disasters have had a significant impact on Japan's semiconductor industry and related fields. In 2019, Typhoon "Feiyan" made landfall, causing the closure of factories such as Murata Manufacturing Co., Ltd., resulting in supply disruptions and transportation paralysis affecting product transportation. Automotive factories were also forced to suspend operations. In the following years, multiple earthquakes occurred in Japan, causing severe damage to companies such as Shin Etsu Chemical and Murata Manufacturing. The supply of key materials such as photoresist and silicon wafers was interrupted, which not only worsened the semiconductor industry, but also exacerbated the global shortage of automotive chips and other products. In 2024, Hurricane Helena in the United States also affected the upstream supply of semiconductor basic materials, highlighting the fragility of the industrial supply chain.
Currently, Mount Fuji has entered a state of "eruption standby", and the risk of a major earthquake in the South China Sea Trough in the 1930s has increased dramatically, with the probability of a major earthquake occurring in the South China Sea Trough rising to 80%. Once disasters overlap, a vast area of Japan from Okinawa to Fukushima may be affected. Previous disasters have already had a serious impact on the semiconductor industry, and the destructive power of this combined disaster will far exceed that of the past. It is highly likely to severely damage Japan's semiconductor materials industry, leading to years long disruptions in the global supply chain. This not only poses a serious threat to the security of Japan's related industries, but also brings a huge crisis to the global industrial chain that relies on Japanese semiconductor materials. Prevention and response are urgently needed.
_proc.jpg)
04
Tariffs: America's' trade war '
Between December 2024 and April 2025, the United States frequently implemented policies towards China in the semiconductor sector, aimed at curbing the development of China's semiconductor industry. In December 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the US Department of Commerce included 140 Chinese semiconductor related companies in the "Entity List", implementing "long arm jurisdiction" and restricting China's access to HBM advanced technology. Many Chinese semiconductor equipment and tool manufacturers find it difficult to obtain high-end products from the United States through legal channels, making it difficult to obtain technology, equipment, and materials, and severely hindering their development.
In April 2025, the United States will first impose "equivalent tariffs" on semiconductor related goods imported from China to the United States, involving equipment and material fields. The tariffs on imported materials such as silicon wafers, electronic specialty gases, and photoresist will increase, leading to increased procurement costs for companies and fluctuations in the supply chain of companies that rely on American materials. In the same month, the US Customs and Border Protection waived import tariffs on semiconductor related goods, bringing tariffs back to pre tariff levels. Although this temporarily eased the tariff pressure on companies, policy uncertainty made it difficult for them to develop long-term stable development strategies.
A series of policies in the United States reflect its intention to maintain its own semiconductor industry hegemony, suppressing China's semiconductor industry from various aspects such as industrial ecology and economic costs. However, these measures will also encourage China's semiconductor industry to firmly embrace independent innovation and accelerate localization substitution to cope with external challenges.
.png)
05
Domestic semiconductor materials counterattack
Under the triple blow of the US Japan supply chain disruption, natural disasters tearing apart the supply chain, and tariffs squeezing costs in the global semiconductor industry, domestic semiconductor materials are breaking through with a combination of "policy driven+technology breakthrough+ecological synergy" - this is not only a technological breakthrough battle, but also a counterattack battle that concerns the independent and controllable nature of the industry chain. The third phase of the National Integrated Circuit Fund, with a budget of 50 billion yuan, anchors the bottleneck link of the lithography machine industry chain and provides a policy support for material self-reliance; Enterprises such as Kehua Microelectronics and Nanda Optoelectronics have achieved technological breakthroughs in the high-end photoresist field, while Bomi Technology PSPI has reached strategic cooperation with downstream leading enterprises to promote the transition of core materials from import dependence to independent supply.
More importantly, SMIC has opened up joint research and development of production lines, and Huawei HiSilicon has implemented a dual supplier system. With a trust attitude of "daring to use, willing to use, and versatile" throughout the entire industry chain, they have connected the "last mile" of domestic materials from the laboratory to the mass production line. As global supply chain turbulence creates alternative windows, domestic materials are accelerating their expansion in advanced processes and core areas through policy empowerment, technological breakthroughs, and ecological synergy resonance. The essence of this counterattack is the inevitable choice of China's semiconductor industry to break through external blockades and reshape the competitive landscape based on self-reliance and controllability. Only by mastering the discourse power of materials can we build a solid foundation for "Chinese chips" in the global industrial chain reconstruction.